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How may race have been implicated in the Rochdale
“grooming case”?
Emmanuel Melissaris explains that – from a legal standpoint – race is either completely
irrelevant or not proven to have any relevance in the Rochdale case. However, it may be
connected to it indirectly and this is what much of the surrounding debate has focused
on. Dangerously, many are tempted to generalise and condemn whole communities and
sadly this has been facilitated by the construction of the case in the press.
I do not want to take a stance as to whether and – if  yes – how and to what extent race
played a part in the so-called Rochdale grooming case in which a verdict was recently reached. Only the
court was in posit ion to do this. Neither will I attempt any hasty sociological arguments. What I want to do
is f rame and disaggregate some issues which tend to be conf lated. In particular, I will distinguish between
f our separate questions. First, were the crimes of  a “racial” nature, i.e. did the convicted of f enders’
criminal responsibility depend to any extent on their att itude to people of  other ethnic origins? Secondly,
could race have had a bearing on sentencing? Thirdly, are there any sociological circumstances linked to
ethnic background, which allowed the of f enders, and may allow others, to f orm the attitude that they did
towards their victims? Fourthly, did the “debate on race” cloud the judgment of  agents in the criminal
justice system handling the cases at its various stages?
The answer to the f irst question is a clear no; the second question was answered by the court in the
negative. The remaining two are still open but they should be tackled in a level-headed manner, which
does not conf use the issues or create dangerous distractions.
Race and Criminal Responsibility
As a general rule in English law motive is not salient to the wrongf ulness of  an act or the
blameworthiness of  a def endant. Having the requisite mindset (intention, knowledge, dishonesty etc.)
when committing the act is suf f icient f or one to be held criminally responsible. To illustrate, if  you kill
someone, all that the law requires is that you intend to end that person’s lif e (or cause grievous bodily
harm but let’s not get too technical). The law has no interest in the reasons that drove you to want that,
say your desire to inherit f rom the victim.
Some circumstances may condition one’s intention. For instance, the def endant may have lost control
because of  actions or words of  the victim or the def endant may believe he or she is acting in self -
def ence. When these conditions are met, the def endant’s criminal responsibility is accordingly qualif ied.
However, such circumstances do not pertain to the def endant’s motivation but rather to the f ormation of
the requisite mindset. It is one thing f or D to intend to do x because by doing x D hoped or intended to
also achieve y and another to say that D intended to do x because D’s judgment was clouded by a
provocative act or in the belief  that D was def ending himself  or herself .
There are, however, some statutory exceptions, the most notable of  which has to do with race. The
Crime and Disorder Act 1998 introduced a range of  of f ences aggravated by the manif estation on the
part of  the def endant of  racial or religious hostility. When one assaults or harasses others, causes
criminal damage, or commits a series of  public order of f ences motivated by or displaying racial hostility,
one is held to have committed a more serious of f ence than simple assault, harassment and so f orth.
The introduction of  such aggravated of f ences is, I think, correct. Criminal of f ences are a disapprobation
of  the violation of  duties that we owe to each other as members of  the same polit ical community, as
cit izens. Of f ences motivated by racial or religious hatred are more than the f ailure to honour such duties;
they manif est the rejection on the part of  the def endant of  the victim as a member of  the polit ical
community to start with.
Should such aggravating circumstances be extended so as to cover a wider range of  of f ences? I don’t
see why not. Sexual of f ences, f or example, manif est a disregard f or the sexual integrity of  the victim. In
light of  the f act that it is predominantly women who are victims of  sexual of f ences, such crimes are also
meant to denounce the objectif ication and instrumentalisation of  women by men. But the f act that this is
the justif icatory core of  sexual of f ences does not mean that they cannot be considered even graver
when they are accompanied by racial or religious hatred.
The of f ences, f or which the men in the Rochdale case were convicted, are not part of  the range of
racially aggravated of f ences. Perhaps they should eventually become so as a matter of  improving the law
and this is a debate worth having but the of f enders in this case could not have been prosecuted, tried
and convicted on the basis of  their att itude towards dif f erent ethnic backgrounds. So, in that limited
sense, their crimes had nothing to do with race.
Race and sentencing
The law, however, allows f or the dif f erential sentencing f or hate crimes, including racially motivated ones.
This does not have to do with the conditions of  responsibility of  the def endant any longer but rather
with the severity with which the criminal justice system will decide to treat the convicted of f ender within
statutory boundaries. This f lexibility allows f or the dif f erential treatment of  of f enders in a way that will
ref lect the dif f erent circumstances, in which they committed the of f ences. And it is applicable to all
of f ences and not only the ones I highlighted earlier.
But again whether to impose a tougher sentence is not lef t to the whim of  a court. There has to be
suf f icient evidence that the of f ence was racially aggravated. In the Rochdale case, it does not seem that
there was any such proof . For example, according to Detective Chief  Superintendent Mary Doyle of
Greater Manchester Police: “There is no evidence that they were targeted because they were white. They
were targeted because they were there”.
It is of  course not unimaginable that the court got this wrong. But it is not f or me to assess this here nor
is it f or anyone in the press or in polit ical discourse. There are appropriate legal channels, through which
such decisions may be appealed against.
Race and the circumstances of crime
So f ar, I have argued that f rom a legal standpoint, race is either completely irrelevant or not proven to
have any relevance in the Rochdale case. However, it may be connected to it indirectly and this is what
much of  the debate surrounding the case has f ocused on.
It is said that there is a culture of  disregard f or women amongst members of  some ethnic communities
and, in particular, disregard f or white women. This is not impossible in exactly the same way that it is not
impossible that, f or instance, the objectif ication of  women in popular culture helps f ormulate the
motivational disposit ion of  those who commit sexual of f ences. Many consider the Rochdale case as
predominantly about the exploitation of  disempowered children and women (see Jane Martinson’s article
in the Guardian). This, I think, is correct but it does not preclude asking why these particular of f enders
were motivated to commit these particular of f ences against these particular victims. And, at the same
time as trying to solve the f ormer problem, we should also be trying to solve the latter.
Note that this is dif f erent to whether such an attitude could have been proven in court as manif ested in
the commission of  the of f ences in a way that it would have had a bearing in sentencing. The question
here is much broader. What is it that stops some cit izens f rom respecting others irrespective of  ethnic
background, gender, religion etc.? And how can we create the right conditions so that respect f or all
members of  the polit ical community will take precedence in everyone’s conscience over contingent
interests or the sense of  belonging in a community?
But we also have to be cautious. Many are tempted to generalise and condemn whole communities and
this has been sadly f acilitated by the construction of  the case in the press. Others think that the solution
is to replace one “cultural identity” with another. I am not able to develop this argument here but I believe
that such views, which regard the issue in such terms, should be rejected not least because they
reproduce the problem rather than solving it. The issue is not to coerce everyone into subscribing to a
moral code but to have a robust democratic and socially just polit ical system, which will allow everyone to
be motivated by their polit ical duties to other cit izens in spite of  but not against their own moral
convictions.
Race and the criminal justice system
I will only highlight this without saying much on it. There are reasons to believe that the f ear of  touching
on the “race issue” may have inf luenced some agents’ actions, although it is more likely that it was the
identity and status of  the victims, which may account f or the lax way that the case was handled. Either
way, recent experience, with the Lawrence case still prominent, has taught us that institutional measures
should be taken so as to relieve the criminal justice system on all levels f rom all such prejudices. And this
should be done as a matter of  urgency.
Note:  This article gives the views of the author, and not the position of the British Politics and Policy blog,
nor of the London School of Economics. Please read our comments policy before posting.
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